This paper argues that a generalized model of social preferences must simultaneously pass two tests; the Variety test (explain outcomes under variety, the V-test) and the Sen's Weak Equity Axiom test (the S-test). It is shown that none of the models proposed to date unconditionally passes these tests. The paper extends the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a generalized model of inequity aversion which passes the two tests and parsimoniously explains interior outcomes in the dictator game and dynamics of outcomes in other games. This is done through introducing equity-bias in the Fehr and Schmidt model. The paper postulates that a player's idea of equitable distribution is state-dependent, where the state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a fair state have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly; those in a superior (inferior) state have positive (negative) equity-bias and accept more (less) than fair distributions as equitable.
Introduction
Economic agents are typically modeled as selfregarding selfish beings whose welfare is unaffected by welfare of others in the society. There have long been concerns about validity of the self-regarding assumption and calls to take other-regarding preferences seriously in economic theorizing. This assumption has heavily been under attack in recent years and efforts to take other-regarding preferences seriously escalated due to laboratory experiments in experimental and behavioral economics. These experiments suggest that individuals value fairness and some, if not all, behave altruistically and when allowed to do so, some sacrifice their self-interest to supposedly punish unfairness. This, naturally, led theoretical economists to look for theories that could explain the sort of behavior exhibited by subjects in these experiments. The main focus of this area of research is to identify other-regarding individualspecific utility or social welfare functions that explain patterns of behavior, such as fairness and reciprocity, observed in data from laboratory experiments. Literature in this area is expanding rapidly and so is variety of the models proposed. These models include both linear (such as Fehr Noting that altering the utility function allows one to explain just anything, Camerer (2003, p 101) writes "The goal is not to explain every different finding by adjusting the utility function just so; the goal is to find parsimonious utility functions, supported by psychological intuition, that are general enough to explain many phenomena in one fell swoop, and also make new predictions".
Models proposed in this area of research however are not subjected to any formal tests to analyze their ability to explain many phenomenon in one fell swoop and ensure their conformity to psychological intuition. This paper formalizes Camerer's idea in the form of two theoretical tests that can be used to judge models of other-regarding preferences. The two tests are (i) the V-test (Variety test) and (ii) the S-test (Sen's Weak Equity Axiom). This paper applies these tests to representative models of the literature and demonstrates that none of the models proposed to date passes these tests simultaneously. They fail to support psychological intuition when put to such a theoretical test, and most are not general enough to explain many phenomena in one fell swoop and do well in experiments of specific designs only. The paper than proposes a generalized model of inequity aversion that passes the two tests simultaneously. This is done through introducing equity-bias in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. Individuals in the Fehr and Schmidt's model are inequality-averse. Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p.822) justifies inequality aversion by arguing that subjects enter the laboratory as equals who are randomly assigned to different roles and do not know anything about each other. This paper highlights the difference between inequity and inequality and argues that individuals are inequity-averse than inequality-averse. This is because subjects cease to be equal once assigned into different roles and given unequal property rights through whatever procedure. A dictator, for example, with all the power to give something or nothing to another player is not equal to a passive recipient who has no claim over the amount given to him/her. This bias in roles leads to bias in equity which is referred to as equity-bias. It argues that, in general, an individual's idea of equitable distribution is state-dependent where state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a fair state have zero equitybias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as equitable distribution. i.e. bias in state leads to bias, not necessarily with the negative connotation, in equity. Given psychological tendencies of an individual, every experimental design or real-world scenario assigns one of the three states to a player which leads to individual-specific valuation of equity and equitable outcomes.
For tractability reasons, this paper limits its discussion to the two most frequently used standard games, namely, the dictator game (DG) and the ultimatum game (UG). In the DG, a player called the dictator is given a certain amount of money with the option to share it with another player, the recipient, in any proportion, 0 to 100 percent, inclusive. In the UG, the dictator is lowered to the status of a proposer and the recipient is alleviated to the status of a responder who is allowed to either accept or reject a distribution proposed by the proposer. When accepted, each player keeps his/her share and when rejected both players get zero. Moreover, the model is developed in a two player environment but results are applicable to games with multiple players competing or otherwise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 0 introduces the two theoretical tests that can be used to judge models of other-regarding preferences. Section 0 provides a review of selected models representative of previous literature and evaluates their performance against the V-test and the S-test. Section 0 provides a discussion on equity vs equality and spells out the concept of equity-bias. Section 0 formally introduces the statedependent/equity-bias model of inequity aversion. This section details dynamics of the model in the dictator and ultimatum games. Section 0 gives a brief comparison of the generalized model with those reviewed in Section 0. Section 0 discusses application of the model to different versions of the dictator and ultimatum games experiments conducted in the literature. Finally, Section 0 concludes the paper.
Theoretical tests for judging models of other-regarding preferences
A number of theoretical models are proposed in the literature to explain patterns of behavior observed during laboratory experiments. The number has been continually increasing and so has been variety of the models proposed. This section identifies two theoretical tests that can be used to judge whether or not a mathematical model should accepted as a generalized model of other-regarding preferences. These tests are discussed below.
The V-test (Variety-test)
Laboratory experiments have tested a wide variety of experimental games. A reasonable model should be general enough to perform consistently across (i) different/similar designs of the same game (e.g. across different versions of the DG and UG) and (ii) across different games of the same nature (e.g. across the dictator, ultimatum and impunity games). This test has been applied, not under the name V-test though, in the literature, as we will note in our discussion later.
The S-test (Sen's WEA test)
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of the models in this area of research is to explain patterns of behavior observed during laboratory experiments. Whether or not a mathematical model that is able to explain outcomes in laboratory experiments conforms to acceptable fairness norms is something that is often ignored and not tested for. One such well-known fairness norm is the Sen's Weak Equity Axiom (WEA). Think of two individuals, one normal and the other with a disability 54 . The disabled person is less efficient in converting a dollar into utility relative to the normal person. Sen's WEA suggest that that when distributing a given sum, one should be more altruistic towards the disabled person than towards the normal person (Sen 1973) 55 . Griffin (1981) argues that the axiom is too strong in the sense that it ignores other equity biases; (i) it allows for the possibility of making the disabled better off than the normal person, and (ii) it does not allow for triage (preferring disabled with higher chances of survival over disabled with relatively less chances of survival). The S-test is therefore assumes that the WEA holds only in the absence of other equity biases.
Formally, let V i =V i (u(x i ),u(x j /) be the social utility of an individual i where x i is payoff of an individual I and u(x i ) is the selfish utility from x i ; x j is the payoff of individual j and u(x j / the selfish utility of from x j .  quantifies the inefficiency of individual j in converting x j into utility relative to i. The larger the value of  the less efficient j is in converting a dollar into utility. The player's objective is to maximize V i subject to a constraint (such as x i +x j =N where N is size of the pie). Let x i * and x j * be the equilibrium payoffs after maximization. The S-test requires d(x j *)/d≥0.
In fact the S-test can be thought of as a special case of the V-test. It is a V-test that invokes variations in as the change in structural parameters.
Experiments show that S-test is satisfied. Eckel and Grossman, (1996) found a significant increase in donations in a dictator game when they increased the extent to which a donation goes to a "deserving" recipient. Brańas-Garza (2006) performed three different dictator games; the standard DG and two versions of the DG with poverty where the dictator is informed that their recipients were poor. Garza found that giving in the poverty game was significantly higher than in the standard DG.
Notice that social utility of the individual i, V i , is related to payoffs through idiosyncratic selfish utility (u i and u j ) and is not expressed as a direct function of the payoffs alone. This distinction is important from point of view of the application of the S-test.
Literature review and application of the two tests
This section reviews selected models of otherregarding preferences. These models include the FS model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 ), the BO model (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and the CFG model (Cox, and Friedman and Gjerstad, 2007) . The following justifies selection of the models in this section.
The model in this paper is primarily an extension of the FS model. The paper therefore starts with a detailed review with the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model which is representative of piecewise linear 55 An even weaker version of Sen's equity axiom, in Sen (1974) , states that the disabled should receive at least as much as the normal person. models of inequality aversion. Results of the analysis therefore apply to any model with inequity modeled as inequality, such as Charness and Rabin (2002) and Erlei (2004) . Appendix A demonstrates as an example that the FS model, or a restricted version of it, can be derived as a monotonic transformation of Charness and Rabin (2002) . The same can be done for other piecewise linear models of the same sort such as Kohler (2003) .
As well known, the FS model cannot explain interior solutions in the DG. Fehr and Schmidt attribute this flaw to the piecewise linearity of preferences in advantageous inequity. They claim that modifying their social welfare function to introduce nonlinearity in the advantageous inequity could resolve the issue (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 p. 823). Whereas this is true, this paper shows that nonlinearity is not necessarily needed to explain interior outcomes. The BO model can be shown to be the FS model with the proposed nonlinearity. This is the reason why this model is also reviewed and analyzed in the next section. Although I do not review other nonlinear models, the analysis in this paper is also applicable to other nonlinear models such as Ottone and Ponzano (2005) .
Finally, most recently, Cox et al. (2007) proposed a parametric model of other-regarding preferences which depends on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. This allows them to make distribution state-dependent, unlike the unconditional distributional preferences in the FS type models, which makes it similar to the model proposed in this paper. The CFG model is shown to be a special case of the generalized model when some additional restrictions are imposed and is therefore reviewed and analyzed as well.
Apart from the distributional preference models above, there are alternative models of intention-based reciprocity (such as Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; and Falk and Fischbacher 2001) . These alternative models are complex and have many equilibria which makes them intractable in most applications (Cox. et al. 2007 ). Although I do not review intention-based models, the model proposed in this paper captures dynamics generated by intentions and encompasses this class of models as well. The analysis on the FS model in this section also applies to Levine (1998) who developed a simple tractable model with intentions where utilities are linear in one's own and the other's payoffs. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) used a simple linear model to explain results of laboratory experiments including the dictator and ultimatum games. They model fairness as self-centered inequity-in fact inequalityaversion, whereby people are willing to sacrifice part of their material payoffs to move in the direction of equality. Assuming two players in the game, their social welfare function of an individual i is linearly increasing in self-payoff, x i , and decreasing in advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, i.e.     ,0 ,0 0 1 and ii   implies that a unit increase in disadvantageous inequality hurts i more than a unit increase in advantageous inequality.
The FS (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) model
Consider application of the model to the DG. Assuming D and R to be payoffs of the dictator and recipient respectively, we can write social utility of the dictator, based on equation (1), as:
The dictator's objective is to maximizes V D subject to D+R=N. Figure 14 
The solution is either D*=N (when 
The proposer's objective is to maximize V p subject to P+R=N and make an offer to the responder good enough to make the responder's social utility non-negative, i.e. the proposer's objective is to maximize V R subject to P+R=N and 
The solution lies on the additional constraint V R =0 when  P <0.5, which implies an equilibrium offer R 0 =r 0,i N , on the line BH with indifference when  P =0.5, and at point B when  P >0.5. The reason why the solution of  P =0.5 excludes points on HE' is that any offer on HE' has some probability of rejection, as a result the individual with  P =0.5 will not be indifferent between BH and HE'. BH will be preferred to HE'. 
proposers will choose offers close to In the first case preferences can be termed as SOR whereas in the second case they may or may not be. Given that in the standard dictator experiment an r>=0.5 is not always observed,  P >0.5 is not dominantly true. This means that the preferences of the proposer are either SR or WOR. i.e. 0 0.5 P  . Since SR and WOR have the same solution, the use of other-regarding preferences for the proposer is irrelevant. The problem with the ER solution is obvious. Indifference means any choice is equally good, which is not an explanation. Thus interior solutions in the UG in the FS model can be interpreted as belonging to a selfish (or WOR) proposer with inequality-averse Responders. The UG solution of the FS model explains interior offers by proposers as a result of fear of rejection, leaving the altruistic part unexplained.
Coming to application of the V-test and the Stest, the FS model does not withstand the V-test. Firstly, it fails to explain interior solutions in the DG. Secondly, it fails to explain outcomes across different designs of the UG. If you modify the UG such that if a responder rejects an offer, 2 units are subtracted from all payoffs, the model predicts that Responders should never reject unequal offers (Camerer 2003, p. 112 ). This is because rejection would reduce payoff of the responder without any effect on inequality. When individuals are inequality-averse in payoffs the model automatically fails the S-test. However when we replace inequality aversion in payoffs by inequality aversion in utility, the S-test is qualified for a special case of equal distribution of utility. This can be ascertained by replacing j x in the FS model with x j / i in equation (1), which becomes a special case of the model (e i =1, implying equality in utility) in this paper and passes the S-test, as we shall see later.
The BO (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) model
The social welfare function of an individual i in the BO model is given (ignoring the x i +x j =0 case) by 2 1 0 and 0 2 2
Notice that V i is linearly increasing in x i and nonlinearly decreasing in inequality. Recall that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) blamed linearity of the social utility function in advantageous inequity for the inability of their model to explain interior outcomes in the DG. (6) is nonlinear in inequality. The BO model is therefore the FS model with nonlinear inequality aversion.
Consider application of the model to the DG. The dictator's objective is to maximize (6) subject to This model can explain interior solutions in the standard DG, it cannot, however adequately explain variety of the dictator games played (the V-test). For example consider the DG where individual i and j are given 10 dollars each. The dictator is given the option of either sharing his/her 10 dollars with the recipient or taking some of the recipient's money, as in Bardsley (2005) . The BO model will give the same solution as the standard DG. These games do not give the same results in practice. Similarly, Camerer (2003, p. 111 ) notes that if you modify the UG such that when the responder rejects a proposal, the monetary payoffs are 10 per cent of the original offer, relative shares will be the same no matter whether the responder accepts or rejects. Thus the responder will always accept any offer; no matter how unequal it is (since the utility from rejection will be lower than the utility with acceptance). This shows that the model fails to pass the V-test.
It is a bit hard to implement the S-test here as the model is defined over payoffs, not utility. One possibility is to think of x i and x j as utilities and replace
x is ambiguously related to but increasing with  at relatively high a i /b i and decreasing at relatively lower values of a i /b i . It is interesting to note than Sen used a quadratic utility function as an example to demonstrate that it fails the WEA.
The CFG (Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad 2007) model
The model is given by: 1 It will become clear later on that the CFG model with  <0 is a special case of the model proposed in this paper.
Equity-bias: equity vs equality
Most of the inequity aversion models, with rare exceptions such as the CFG, are models of inequality aversion than inequity aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) note: "The determination of the relevant reference group and the relevant reference outcome for a given class of individuals is ultimately an empirical question. The social context, the saliency of particular agents, and the social proximity among individuals are all likely to influence reference groups and outcomes. Because in the following we restrict attention to individual behavior in economic experiments, we have to make assumptions about reference groups and outcomes that are likely to prevail in this context. In the laboratory it is usually much simpler to define what is perceived as an 56 Their argument is that for σ<0, utility is -∞ at xj=0 (which is observed in the data) so we must have σ≥0. This condition is not necessary as the solution can be explained by a θi=0 for any non-zero value σ or by θi<1 with σ=1. 57 The estimated value of  changes in these estimations which needs justification. 58 This points towards issues related to the estimation procedures adopted in Cox et el. 2007 , which is worth investigating but is outside the scope of the paper. equitable allocation by the subjects. The subjects enter the laboratory as equals, they do not know anything about each other, and they are allocated to different roles in the experiment at random. Thus, it is natural to assume that the reference group is simply the set of subjects playing against each other and that the reference point, i.e., the equitable outcome, is given by the egalitarian outcome" (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, pp 821-22) Assuming individuals to be equal during experiments is an oversimplification which is not true in all contexts. Once an experimenter assigns subjects into different roles, through whatever procedure, and gives them unequal property rights, they cease to be equal. For example, a dictator with all the power to give something or nothing to another player is not equal to a passive recipient who has no claim over the amount given to him/her. There are biases that are hard-wired into them, such as self-serving bias, which interact with the subjects' heterogeneous socioeconomic background and real-life experiences (and their experience in the laboratory); this in turn affect their choices when given the power to do so. Bias in roles therefore leads to bias in a subject's idea of equitable distribution. It is therefore not right to assume that other-regarding individuals are universally inequality-averse irrespective of context. A reasonable postulation, in general, would be to think of a subject's idea of equitable distribution as statedependent, where the state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. Psychological parameters primarily include tendencies that are either hard-wired in human nature, such a selfserving bias, or a part of one's culture; ones real-life experiences (including experience in the laboratory); one's perception about the behavior of others (kind, selfish etc); and one's perception about his/her socioeconomic status relative to those of others. The "structural parameters" mainly relate to design of the experiment (such as how are different roles and property rights allocated, information about the socioeconomic status of players, wording of the experiment, and role of the experimenter etc).
Let us define three different states, Fair (F), Superior (S), and inferior (INF). Given individualspecific psychological tendencies/parameters, every experimental design assigns one of the three states to players. When assigned a fair state, The player's idea of equity is a fair one (i.e. equal distribution); and when assigned a superior state (S) or inferior (INF) states, her idea of equity is a biased one. Let E i =x i /x j be the measure of equity of an individual i over x i (own payoff) and x j (other's payoff). When i is assigned a fair state, F, his/her idea of an equitable distribution is a fair one, i.e. E i =1. However, when assigned a biased state, S or INF, he/she is emotionally locked into choosing a biased state, E i= 1+b i where b i quantifies equity-bias and assumes a non-zero value. In state S, b i >0 and i values more than fair distributions as equitable. Similarly, b i <0 in state INF and i accepts/values less than fair distributions as equitable.
For example, in the DG, a dictator is assigned a state superior than the one assigned to the recipient. The dictator owns all the money and is assigned the right to use it as he/she pleases. The recipient is neither a party to the "production" of value nor legally entitled to receive any share of the money. Thus, when behaving altruistically, he/she does not necessarily find it equitable to split the pie equally. Competition basically changes the relative location of players on the equity-bias chart, and hence their idea of equitable share. Similarly, a recipient in the ultimatum game is assigned an inferior state, and may accept less than fair offers as equitable. This plays an important role in explaining dynamics of the outcomes in a wide variety of the two games, and other games of the same sort, as we shall see later.
The model
With the above discussion in mind, let us generalize the FS model of inequality aversion to a model of inequity aversion.
Let The generalized FS model is given below
where It might however be helpful to point out that this restriction is needed to explain interior outcomes and ensures that social utility is maximum at the equitable distribution of payoffs. In the FS model this restriction was 1/ 2 i   , which in our notation is equivalent to
, see Appendix B for proof). In order to understand the dynamics generated by the value of social beta and its interpretation, I will stick to the general restriction on social beta as above.
Without loss of generality, let us impose constant marginal utility of money so that: x into the utility of j. The fact that the preference technology f may not necessarily be equal to g captures dynamics of differences in socioeconomic status of players that leads to equity-bias in payoffs. In the specification in equation (9), i  embodies individual i's belief about the socioeconomic status of individual j relative to his/her own socio-economic status. For example, when individual i believes he/she is socially better off than individual j (say because of j's disability or because j is poor relative to i), i  is greater than 1.
i  >1 implies that i believes that j is less efficient in deriving satisfaction from a dollar than i him/herself or a dollar given to j generates lesser utility than it does to i (vice versa for i  <1). Appendix C derives the utility function in equation (7) as a monotonic transformation of a social utility function that explicitly models differences in socio-economic status. Substituting (8) and (9) in (7) gives: ,0 ,0
  
. E i is the equitable distribution of payoffs (not utility) as perceived by individual i and e i is an equivalent measure in terms of utility. The value of this is determined by equity-bias as E i =1+b i where b i is equity-bias as discussed earlier. When an individual is assigned a fair state, the value of E i is equal to 1 (b i =0), when assigned a superior state E i >1 (b i >0) and when assigned an inferior state E i <1 (b i <0).
Notice that the paper defines states and bias in terms of payoffs for convenience. It is possible for these states to be different in terms of utility. For example, consider a fair state in utility (i.e. e i =1), which implies E i =1/ i . E i could be less than, equal to or greater than one (depending upon whether  i is greater, equal to, or less than one respectively) which corresponds to positive, zero, and negative equity-bias respectively. Thus one can think of an individual belonging to a superior state in utility and possibly belonging to any of the three states in payoffs and vise versa.
The players' objective is to maximize (10) subject to x i +x j =N. Figure 16 
, when 1 (on point F) x E x  (see Figure 16 panel (b)) Thus equilibrium is defined by solution to the following two equations:
x E x  (11) and the budget constraint
Solving (11) and (12) gives
The solution is simply the intersection of 0 i I  curve and the budget constraint, as shown in panel (c) of Figure 16 .
This equilibrium solution can also be arrived at using a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) social utility function under conditions required to ensure conformity to the S-test. Section 0 derives and discusses the issue in detail.
As a passing note, sometimes it might be easier to work with another version of the model given below: ,0 ,0 
Application to the Dictator Game
Let D be payoff of the dictator, and R be payoff of the recipient. Based on equation (10), social utility of the dictator can be written as:
Maximization of equation (13) subject to
Theoretically D  can assume any value. We restricted it to greater than 1 ( D  >1) in the model because it ensures unique interior solutions observed in the laboratory experiments. This is why we assumed this value of social beta in the model and restricted D  to be greater than unity. This is proved in proposition 2 below. Proposition 1: The equilibrium offer, 1-d*, made by the dictator varies with state-dependent equity-bias and can be anywhere between 0 and 1 inclusive.
Proof:
As
Theoretically, the equity-bias can take any positive or negative value. Thus, when the dictator's valuation of equity is infinitely biased, the offer will be equal to zero (i.e. 
 
The interpretation of this condition is straight forward. The dictator will have to sacrifice
dollars to reduce advantageous inequity by 1 unit. The one unit reduction in inequity will increase social utility by D  . Thus for the dictator to find it optimal to sacrifice an extra dollar, it must increase his/her social utility more than the sacrifice in terms of selfish utility.
The model clearly explains the corner as well as interior outcomes observed during experiments. This model acknowledges that individuals are heterogeneous and differ in their valuation of equity; hence their social utility is maximized at different offers. This leads them to optimally offer different amounts. In fact the corner solution, which is the selfish Nash equilibrium, can also be interpreted as an equitable equilibrium with E D =∞.
Recall that the restriction on i  ensures that social utility has a maximum, at the state-dependent equitable distribution. The social beta is inversely related to i E , implying that for a relatively larger equity-bias, a relatively lower social beta is required for the social utility to have a maximum.
Application of the model to the Ultimatum Game
Now consider application of the model to the standard ultimatum game experiment. Let P be payoff of the proposer and R be payoff of the responder. The utility function of the proposer and the responder can be written (using equation (10)) as:
The proposer's objective is to maximize (14) subject to P+R=N. The proposer's offer will be equal 59 An alternative approach would be to maximize social utility of the responder and workout the minimum acceptable threshold at minimum ER. The social utility at this equilibrium may be equal to or greater than zero. This innovation however does not buy the model any interesting insight. 60 It is possible for some players to find R 0 >R A offensive and reject them (this is when R 0 >RERN/(R-1)). I ignore such a possibility in discussions but the model does allow for such interpretations and solution.
derived by Fehr and Schmidt (1999 
Since, in practice, we may have agents with different equity-biases, let us capture this heterogeneity by expressing Of course, when E=C the proposer's equitable offer will always be accepted irrespective of type of the responder. The (0,0) equilibrium implies that the proposer does not offer more than NE because he/she thinks it is inequitable and should be accepted by any responder; if not, he/she is happy to face the consequences. Here the proposer can clearly be classified as other-regarding, unlike the FS model. The responder, on the other hand, rejects the offer, believing that it is less than what would make him/her just happy. The main reason for this rejection is that the offer is less than the minimum acceptable threshold. This rejection could be motivated by reciprocity, intentions, social punishment, selfassertiveness or any other reason. When rejections inflict monetary losses to proposers (as in the ultimatum game), all of these reasons could be in play. Impunity games narrow down the list to social punishment and self-assertiveness. When 1 P   , the solution is similar to the FS model as discussed earlier.
Comparison with representative models of the literature
As obvious, the FS model is a special case of the generalized model in this paper. The generalized model reduces to the FS model when E i =1 which is relevant only when players are assigned into a fair state. The generalized model allows E i to vary with state which is related to changes in equity-bias. Recall that in the FS model, the other-regarding behavior of the proposer was irrelevant for interior solution in the UG, whereas it is not irrelevant in the generalized model as the solution is not necessarily determined by the V R =0 constraint (see Figure 17 ). As indicated earlier, the FS model cannot explain interior solutions in the DG. Fehr and Schmidt argue that this is because of the piecewise linearity of preferences in advantageous inequity and that introducing nonlinearity in the advantageous inequity could resolve the issue. As shown earlier, the BO model is the FS model with the proposed nonlinearity. This specification however, like the FS model, fails the Vtest (and, at some values of the preference parameters, the S-test). This paper shows that the nonlinearity is not necessarily needed to explain interior outcomes. When  i =- i , the generalized model reduces to:
Assuming  i <1, this is equivalent to the CFG model with Similarly, when σ=1, indifference curves are linear and would give corner solution only (x i =1 or 0). The CFG model therefore requires diminishing marginal utility of money to explain interior outcomes, the model in this paper does not as it can explain any solution at any given σ.
Application of the model
As mentioned earlier, there are a variety of dictator and ultimatum games experimental economists have tested in the laboratory. Even though solutions of the model in this paper are derived for the standard dictator and ultimatum games, they can easily be applied to different designs, contexts and multiple player versions of these games. All we need to do is work out what impact would a particular innovation to an experimental design have on the relative state of players, and for that matter their equity-bias; predictions about the solution follow intuitively. Understandably, it may not be possible in some cases to predict what impact a particular innovation to an experimental design would have on the relative state of a player beforehand; experiments could be used to understand the dynamics of such innovations on states. Similarly, laboratory experiments could be used to quantify the impact of alternative policy tools on equity-bias which could help in choosing efficient policies. The notion of equity-bias is general in nature and embodies all information related to socioeconomic status, intentions, reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment role of the experimenter, etc. The model therefore provides a unified framework to understand outcomes of the research in a broader context. The following discussion provides some examples relevant examples. 61 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) cites empirical evidence to support ii>0.
In the standard DG, the state assigned to a dictator is superior than the one assigned to the receiver. The recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus it seems natural for the dictator to have a notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare and make offers in the interior. The ultimatum game introduces two changes to the DG. Firstly, it lowers the status of the dictator to a relatively inferior position by assigning him/her the role of a proposer. Secondly, it alleviates the status of the recipient to that of a responder who becomes an active partner to the creation of value. This arrangement leads to a reduction in equity-bias of the dictator (now the proposer) and an improvement in equity-bias of the recipient (now the responder). In a one-shot ultimatum game the proposer is in a relatively superior state than the responder (by just being the first mover), which allows for the possibility of less than fair splits as equitable offers. In a repeated ultimatum game their relative states converge to a fair state and the offers converge to an even split.
The wording of the experiment and instruction list (Bolton et al.. 1998; Hoffman et al. 1999 ), identity of the experimenter, social distance, and design of the experiment seem to have an impact on outcomes (Hoffman et al. 1994; . All these factors change the relative positions of players in the game, and hence their equity-bias, which show up in their offers and changes in the threshold for accepting or rejecting offers. Hoffman et al. (1994) , for example, found a reduction in offers by dictators when anonymity was increased, implying that anonymity increases equitybias. This means that part of the altruism in the DG is to avoid being labeled as too selfish, to look good or not to look bad. Similarly, the experiment by Brańas-Garza (2006) cited earlier, which introduces poverty in the DG, concludes that informing the dictator about the poverty of the recipient leads to more altruism. Again, this is because information about the socioeconomic status of players leads to changes in relative states and equity-biases, which leads to different outcomes.
Camerer and Thaler (1995 p. 216) mentioned that sharing shrinks when, instead of giving the dictator a sum as "manna from heaven", the dictator is made to feel as if he earned the right to the sum. Making the dictator feel as if he/she earned the right to the sum essentially changes his/her location to a relatively superior state, which leads to an increase in his emotional state of equity-bias. Similarly, Schotter et al. (1996) introduced property rights in two-stagesurvival dictator and ultimatum games. In the first stage proposers were competing with each other in offering higher amounts to a single responder. They earned property rights to the sum when a proposer accepted the responder's offer. They moved to the second stage with property rights they earned in the first state. In the second stage they offered lesser amounts and responders rejected smaller amounts less often. The offers were still significantly higher than zero and considered to be fair by player 2. This is because earning property rights in the second stage increased equity-bias of the proposers. The responders also made note of that and respected it by revising their lowest threshold.
Similarly, structure/design of the experiment also plays a role. Consider two types of dictator games. (i) First, assume that the dictator is given $20 to share with another anonymous recipient. (ii) Second, consider the same two players now given 10 dollars each, with the dictator having the option of giving or taking away up to 10 dollars. Both experiments involve sharing 20 dollars but individuals are not located on the same position on the bias chart. The dictator in (i) is in a relatively superior state than in (ii). Thus we expect the share of the dictator in (ii) to be lower than, or at least as much as, in (i). Similarly, in the ultimatum game we expect the responder in (ii) to reject offers higher than in (i); this is because he/she is not in as inferior state in (ii) as he/she is in (i).
The model also provides an explanation as to why the hypotheses in experiments such as Bardsley (2005) are erroneous and provide a context for explaining results of his experiment. Bardsley hypothesized that the standard DG would give the same solution if the sum was instead distributed and the dictator was given the option of (giving and) taking money from the recipient. Arguing that the dictator is facing a similar problem of allocating the same budget, optimal allocation should be the same. The key assumption in Barsley's argument is that preferences of the dictator are the same in the two experiments. The model in this paper postulates that preferences are state-dependent and the two models belong to two different states; expecting it to give the same solution is simply wrong.
An increase in competition on the proposer's side is expected to reduce the proposer's equity-bias, leading to relatively larger offers; increase the responder's equity-bias, leading to rejection of relatively larger offers. However, if proposers were to compete for lowest offers, the proposer's equity-bias is expected to increase, leading to smaller offers, and that of the Responders is expected to move further away from fair offers, leading them to accept relatively lower offers. This holds only if the Responders are aware of the nature of the competition. Camerer and Thaler (1995) writes;
"A good general theory of fairness predicts that fair-minded players behave self-interestedly in some situations. Two experiments show that competition can push ultimatum offers closer to zero, in ways consistent with fairness. Schotter et al. (1994) created competition among proposers. Eight proposers made offers in a first stage. The four who earned the most in the first-stage game could then play a second stage game (with a different player). Sensible fairness theories would say that proposers now have an excuse for making low offers-they must compete for the right to play again-so low offers are not as unfair, and Responders will accept them more readily. That is what happened."
Information asymmetry may also play its role in positioning players on the state/bias chart and so may intentions. About the role of intentions in rejections in ultimatum games, Fehr and Schmidt (2005) conclude "Taken together, the evidence from Blount (1995) , Kagel et al. (1996) , Offerman (1999) , Brandts and Sola (2001) and Falk et al. (2000a Falk et al. ( , 2000b Falk et al. ( , 2003 supports the view that subjects want to punish unfair intentions or unfair types. Although the evidence provided by the initial study of Blount was mixed, the subsequent studies indicate a clear role of these motives."
Similarly, in experiments by Kagel et al. (1996) where subjects had to divide 100 chips in an UG, chips were convertible to monetary payoffs at different prices across players. For example in one treatment responders' chips were valued 10 cents each and that of the proposers valued at 30 cents each. Players knew their own conversion rate but not necessarily that of others. When the proposer is aware that his/her chips are valued three times more than that of the responder, an equal monetary split would require the proposer to give 75 chips to the responder. When the information was available to responders, they rejected unequal money splits more frequently than when they were not aware of the difference in chips' money value. Thus unequal proposals were rejected at higher rates than unintentional unequal proposals (Fehr and Schmidt, 2005) . Similarly, another important insight of the experiment was that proposers offered close to 50 percent when there was information asymmetry. This implies that proposers prefer to seem fair than be fair. Camerer and Thaler (1995) believes this is "an important reminder that self-interested behavior is alive and well, even in ultimatum games". This also points toward an important distinction between altruism/fairness as a natural instinct and altruism/fairness as a code or altruism as an instinct complemented by religious or moral affiliations.
This could intuitively be predicted by the model as well. Information asymmetry in this experiment positions proposers in a relatively superior state and they make offers closer to 50% than 75%. This is when they prefer to seem fair than act fair. What the model also predicts is that individuals with commitment to moral codes through say religious or cultural affiliations would offer closer to the 75%. Information asymmetry should as such not change their relative state. It will be interesting to investigate whether or not individuals with different religious affiliation would behave differently.
Similarly it can be shown that the framework in this paper explains the wide variety of data in laboratory experiments such as Blount (1995) and Falk et al. (2003) . The framework also provides a rationale for the three-player games by Güth and Damme (1998) , Kagel and Wolf (2001) , and Berby-Meyer and Nuedereke (2005) by invoking player and design-specific equity-bias.
Summary and conclusions
This paper takes note of the variety and multiplicity of models of other-regarding preferences proposed in the literature on experimental and behavioral economics and points toward the need for certain criteria to judge these models. The paper identifies two tests, the Variety test (ability of a model to explain outcomes under variety or alternative scenarios) and the S-test (ability of a model to conform to Sen's Weak Equity Axiom), that can be used to judge any model of otherregarding preferences. It is argued that, for a mathematical model to qualify as a social welfare function, it must simultaneously pass the two tests. It is shown that none of the models proposed to date passes the two tests simultaneously with the exception of the Cox et al. (2007) model which simultaneously passes the two tests when some additional restrictions are imposed.
This paper extends the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion to a generalized model of inequity aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that subjects enter laboratory as equals and should therefore use egalitarian outcome as a reference outcome. This is why the Fehr and Schmidt model cannot explain interior outcomes in the dictator game. This paper argues that once assigned into different roles and given unequal property rights, subjects cease to be equal and equal-distribution is not necessarily the equitable norm. The paper introduces the concept of equity-bias and postulates that one's idea of equitable distribution is state-dependent where the state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. When assigned to a fair state, one's valuation of equity is a fair one (even split), and when assigned to a biased state (superior or inferior) one's valuation of equity is a biased one. i.e. bias in state leads to bias in equity. Individuals in a fair state have zero equitybias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than a fair distribution as an equitable distribution. Bias in state therefore leads to bias in equity. Given the psychological tendencies/state of an individual, every experimental design assigns one of the three states to the player, which leads to individual-specific valuation of equity. Predictions about outcomes in different experiments, or the same experiment with different designs, can be made through predicting its impact on equity-bias.
The notion of equity-bias is general in nature and embodies all information related to socio-economic status, intentions, reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment, role of the experimenter, etc. The model therefore is all-encompassing and provides a unified framework to understand outcomes of research in a broader context. For example, in the standard dictator game, the state assigned to the dictator is superior than the one assigned to the receiver. This is because the recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus, it seems natural for the dictator to have a notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare. The standard ultimatum game introduces two changes to the dictator game. Firstly, it assigns the dictator the role of a proposer, which reduces his/her superiority; secondly, it alleviates the status of the recipient to that of a responder who becomes an active partner to the creation of value. This arrangement leads to reduction in the equity-bias of the dictator (now the proposer) and increase in the equity-bias of the recipient (now the responder). Thus the fear of rejection, along with other factors, changes equity-bias of the players, hence equitable distribution. This is the main reason why offers in the dictator game are positive but lower than in the ultimatum game. Competition changes the relative position of the players and their valuation of equitable distribution. So does the design of experiments, such as the way property rights are assigned (e.g. earned or manna from heaven), the wording of the experiment/instructions, role of the experimenter etc.
The model is more general than its previous counterparts. It parsimoniously explains interior solutions in the dictator game and provides a framework to understand outcomes in other experiments. It provides a framework to understand why outcomes change with design of the experiment and across different experiments of the same nature.
The framework in this paper is simple and does not require individuals to process complex information. It rationalized all kind of choices, smart or otherwise, as state-dependent other-regarding utility maximizing outcomes. Policy makers can benefit from understanding the evolution of relative states and equity-biases. The effectiveness of alternative policy reforms can be explored in laboratory experiments through its impact on equity-bias. Research therefore should be directed to unfold the dynamics and evolution of equitable states relevant to policy debates and positive analysis of issues of interest. The model provides a framework to understand the relevance and importance of equity-bias which is determined by psychological (natural tendencies as as self-serving bias, individual characteristics etc) and structural parameters (design of the experiment, the manner in which property rights are assigned, wording of the experiment, real world scenarios etc). Laboratory experiments could be used to determine the evolution of these states.
The existing literature and experimental results obtained thus far can be re-organized in the light of their impact on equity-bias for organized conclusions. The framework can also be used to understand outcomes of other games, such as public good and trust games.
